We consider constructing capacity-achieving linear codes with minimum message size for private information retrieval (PIR) from N non-colluding databases, where each message is coded using maximum distance separable (MDS) codes, such that it can be recovered from reading the contents of any T databases. It is shown that the minimum message size (sometimes also referred to as the sub-packetization level) is significantly, in fact exponentially, lower than previously believed. More precisely, when K > T / gcd(N, T ) where K is the total number of message in the system and gcd(·, ·) means the greatest common divisor, we establish, by providing both a novel code construction and a matching converse, the minimum message size as lcm(N − T, T ), where lcm(·, ·) means the least common multiple. On the other hand, when K is small, we show that it is in fact possible to design codes with a message size even smaller than lcm(N − T, T ).
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of private information retrieval (PIR), since its introduction [1] , has attracted significant attention from researchers in the fields of theoretical computer science, cryptography, information theory, and coding theory. In the classical PIR model, a user wishes to retrieve one of the K available messages, from N non-communicating databases, each of which has a copy of these K messages. User privacy needs to be preserved during message retrieval, which requires that the identity of the desired message not be revealed to any single database. To accomplish the task efficiently, good codes should be designed to download the least amount of data perbit of desired message, the inverse of which is referred to as the capacity of the PIR system. This capacity problem in the classical setting was settled only recently [2] .
In practical systems, the databases may suffer from failures, and are also storage-space-constrained. Erasure codes can be used to improve both storage efficiency and failure resistance. This consideration motivated the investigation of PIR from MDS-coded databases [3] - [6] , with coding parameter (N, T ), i.e., the messages can be recovered by accessing any T databases. The capacity of PIR from MDS-coded databases was characterized [4] as
In a given code, the smallest required number of symbols in each message is called the message size L (sometimes also referred to as the sub-packetization level), which is an important factor impacting the practicality and efficiency of the code. The capacity-achieving code given in [4] requires L = T N K , which can be extremely large for a system with even a moderate number of messages. The problem of reducing the message size of capacity-achieving codes was recently considered by Xu and Zhang [6] , and it was shown that under the assumption that all answers are of the same length, the message size must satisfy L ≥ T (N/ gcd(N, T )) K−1 . These existing results may have left the impression that capacityachieving codes would necessitate a message size exponential in the number of messages.
In this work, we show that the minimum message size for capacity-achieving PIR codes can in fact be significantly smaller than previously believed, by providing a capacityachieving linear code with a message size L = lcm(N −T, T ).
The key difference from existing codes is that the proposed code reduces its reliance on symmetry, and the answers may be of different lengths. It is further shown that this is in fact the minimum message size when K > T / gcd(N, T ), the proof of which requires a careful analysis of the converse proof of the capacity. Finally, we show that, when K is small, it is in fact possible to design codes with a message size even smaller than lcm(N − T, T ). The code constructions and converse proof reflect a reverse engineering approach extending our previous efforts [7] , [8] . Particularly, in [7] , a similar approach was adopted to tackle the canonical PIR setting with replicated databases, and a capacity-achieving PIR code was discovered with the minimum message size and upload cost; in the current work the databases are instead required to be MDS-coded. Both the analysis technique and the code construction in the current work, however, are considerably more involved due to the additional coding requirement and the integer constraints.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
There are a total of K mutually independent messages W 0 , W 1 , . . . , W K−1 in the system. Each message is uniformly distributed over X L , i.e., the set of length-L sequences in the finite alphabet X . All the messages can be collected and written as a single length-LK row vector W 0:K−1 . Each message is MDS-coded and then distributed to N databases, such that from any T databases, the messages can be fully recovered. Since the messages are (N, T ) MDS-coded, it is without loss of generality to assume that L = M · T for some integer M .
When a user wishes to retrieve a particular message W k * , N queries Q
is the query for database-n. The retrieval needs to be information theoretically private, i.e., any database is not able to infer any knowledge as to which message is being requested. For this purpose, a random key F in the set F is used together with the desired message index k * to generate the set of queries Q n . Each symbol in the answers also belongs to the finite field X , and the answers may have multiple (and different numbers of) symbols. Using the answers A [k * ] 0:N −1 from all N databases, together with F and k * , the user then reconstructsŴ k * . A more rigorous definition of the linear information retrieval process we consider in this work can be specified by a set of coding matrices and functions as follows. For notational simplicity, we denote the cardinality of a set A as |A|.
Definition 1: A linear private information retrieval code from linearly MDS-coded databases (a linear MDS-PIR code) consists of the following coding components:
1) A set of MDS encoding matrices:
whereG k n , k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , K − 1} is an L × M matrix in the alphabet X for encoding message k, and eachG n encodes the messages into the information to be stored at database-n, denoted as V n = W 0:K−1 ·G n ; 2) A set of MDS decoding recovery functions:
for each T ⊆ {0, 1, . . . , N −1} such that |T | = T , whose outputs are denoted asW 0:
i.e., for retrieving message W k * , the user sends the query Q
i.e., the length of the answer from each database, a nonnegative integer, is a deterministic function of the query, but not the particular realization of the messages; 5) A query answer generating matrix
i.e., the answer A
is the query received by database-n; 6) A reconstruction function ψ :
i.e., after receiving the answers, the user reconstructs the message asŴ k * = ψ(A [k * ] 0:N −1 , k * , F). These functions satisfy the following three requirements:
Note that Q
is in fact a random variable, since F is the random key. It follows that even when the messages are viewed as deterministic, A In order to measure the performance of an MDS-PIR code, we consider the following two metrics, with the focus on minimizing the latter while keeping the former optimal:
1) The retrieval rate, which is defined as
This is the number of bits of desired message information that can be privately retrieved per bit of downloaded data. It was shown [4] that the maximum retrieval rate, i.e., the capacity of such MDS-PIR systems, is as given in (1). 2) The message size L, which is the number of symbols to represent each individual message. This quantity should be minimized, because in practical applications, a smaller message size implies a more versatile code. We will need several more parameters before proceeding. Define p := gcd(N, T ), then
for some positive integer r and s, which are co-prime.
III. A NEW MDS-PIR CODE
In this section, we provide an MDS-PIR code construction with message length L = lcm(N − T, T ). Each message W k can be divided into M sub-messages, denoted as W k = (W k,0 , W k,1 , . . . , W k,r−1 ), and each sub-message contains T symbols in the alphabet X . The construction relies on two novel ingredients: a delicate indexing on the key (query) and the introduction of pseudo code symbols (sub-messages).
The first novel ingredient in the construction is the random key F = (F 0 , F 1 , . . . , F K−1 ), which is a length-K vector uniformly distributed in the set where (·) r+s indicates modulo (r + s). We need to choose a (in fact, any) linear (N, T )-MDS code C, in the alphabet X as our base code. The coding functions can then be given as follows:
1) Each sub-message W k,m , m = 0, 1, . . . , r − 1 and
n ∈ X placed at database-n, wherẽ G * n is the n-th column of the T × N generator matrix of code C operated on each sub-message, which produces the stored information at database-n.
2) The MDS decoding function is obvious which is naturally induced by that of C. 3) For any n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}, the query generating function produces a length-K column vector as
where T indicates matrix transpose. 4) After receiving the query, database-n first produces a K × s query matrixQ ñ
where 1 t is the all-one column vector of length t; the element ofQ n on the k-th row and i-th column is denoted asQ k,i n . The query length function is then defined as:
where 1(·) is the indicator function, i.e., n is the number of columns inQ n which has an element less than r.
5)
The second novel ingredient of the proposed code is the introduction of pseudo code symbols and sub-messages: n , n ∈ T i , can be written as
where the length-T row vectorW [k * ],i is defined as
Note thatW [k * ],i is not a function of n, sinceQ k,i n =Q k,i n unless k = k * . Thus as long as |T i | ≥ T , the vector W [k * ],i can be fully recovered by the MDS property of the code C; see Fig. 1 . Further note that the i-th component ofÃ
from which, sinceW [k * ],i is known, we can recover Table I with the answers indicated by the encoded symbols V k n . We omit the index i since here r = 1. Consider the case to retrieve message k * = 1, and the key is F = (0, 1, 2) T . Then the queries are Q 0 = (0, 1, 2) T , Q 1 = (0, 2, 2) T , Q 2 = (0, 0, 2) T .
The corresponding queries and answers are marked bold in Table I . It is seen that from (V 0 0 , V 0 1 ), the symbol V 0 2 can be recovered by the MDS property, and thus V 1 2 . Similarly, we can recover V 1 1 . Using both (V 1 1 , V 1 2 ), we can then recover the original message W 1 by decoding the MDS code C.
According to 6) in the coding functions, the correctness of the proposed code hinges on two conditions: |T i | ≥ T for all i = 0, 1, . . . , s − 1 and |N m | ≥ T for all m = 0, 1, . . . , r − 1. We establish these two conditions in the following lemma, whose proof can be found in [9] .
Lemma 1: In the construction above, for any request of message-k * and any random key F, 1) |T i | = T for any i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , s − 1}; 2) |N m | = T for any m ∈ {0, 1, . . . , r − 1}.
Theorem 1: The proposed information retrieval scheme is both private and capacity-achieving. 
Proof: The fact that the code is private is immediate, by observing that Q 
assuming an arbitrary message k * is being requested. The probabilities involved in the summand i = i * depend on 
By the definition ofQ k,i n , it is clear that if any item in
is less than r, then min k=0,1,...,K−1Q k,i * n < r for all n = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, which will induce N transmitted symbols in the retrieval from all databases for i = i * ; this event E occurs with probability 1 − (s/(r + s)) K−1 . On the other hand, when the event E does not occur, in the vector (F k * + i * + 0, F k * + i * + 1, . . . , F k * + i * + N − 1) r+s the number of elements that are less than r is N − T , which induces (N − T ) symbols being transmitted. Therefore
from which it follows that the code is indeed capacity achieving, by taking into account (8) .
IV. PROPERTIES OF CAPACITY-ACHIEVING LINEAR MDS-PIR CODES
In this section, we provide two key properties of capacityachieving linear MDS-PIR codes, which play an instrumental role in our study of the minimum message size. , n ∈T | W J , A (qn) n , n ∈ T = 0, whereT is the complement of T . Property P0 is a direct consequence of the linear MDS-PIR code definition. Property P1 states that the interference signals from the answers of any T databases in a capacityachieving code can fully determine all interference signals in other answers. The inequalities in Lemma 3 are the key steps in deriving the capacity of MDS-PIR codes. Conversely, for any capacity-achieving linear MDS-PIR code, these inequalities must hold with equality, implying the following theorem. The formal proofs of these properties can be found in [9] .
V. MINIMUM MESSAGE SIZE FOR CAPACITY-ACHIEVING LINEAR CODES
The main results of this section are the following theorems. From Theorem 3, we can conclude that the MDS-PIR code proposed in section III indeed has the minimum message size when K > T / gcd(N, T ). On the other hand, Theorem 4 confirms that for small K, it is in fact possible to construct a capacity-achieving code with an even smaller message size.
The proof of Theorem 3 relies on the delicate relation among a set of auxiliary quantities H k n 's and I k n 's which we define next. For any given capacity-achieving linear MDS-PIR code, let (k,f ) be the maximizer for the following optimization problem for n = 0:
Define for k = 0, 1, . . . , K − 1 and n = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1,
The following lemma implies that the optimization problem in (21) has the same maximizer for all n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}.
Lemma 4: For any capacity-achieving linear MDS-PIR code, ∀n = n where n , n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}, any k * ∈ {0, 1, . . . , K − 1}, any f ∈ F,
This lemma also implies that we can define Hk := Hk 0 = . . . = Hk N −1 . The next two lemmas establish a critical property of, and relevant relations between, H k n 's and I k n 's. 
and when K > s,
The proofs of Lemma 4-6 can be found in [9] . We are now ready to prove Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 3:
When K > s, by (24) Proof of Theorem 4: Since L = M T > 0, it is trivial to see that L ≥ T , and thus it only remains to provide a construction of a capacity-achieving linear MDS-PIR code with such a message size.
Let database-n store two symbols V 0 n , V 1 n ∈ X , which are MDS-coded symbols of messages W 0 and W 1 , respectively. When the user wishes to retrieve message W k * where k * ∈ {0, 1}, two query strategies are used.
• With probability T N , randomly partition N databases into 3 disjoint sets G (0) , G (1) and G (2) , with |G (0) | = N − T , |G (1) | = 2T − N and |G (2) | = N − T . The user requests V 0 n ⊕ V 1 n from databases in G (0) , (V 0 n , V 1 n ) from those in G (1) , and V 1−k * n in G (2) . • With probability N −T N , randomly partition N databases into 2 disjoint sets G (3) and G (4) , with |G (3) | = T and |G (4) | = N − T . The user requests V k * n from databases in G (3) , but no information from those in G (4) . It is straightforward to verify that the code is indeed correct, private, and capacity-achieving.
